
1.Centre for Advanced Photonics and Electronics, University of Cambridge, 9 JJ Thomson Ave, Cambridge CB3 0FA, UK
2.Quantum Communications Hub, Information Centre, Department of Physics, University of York, York YO10 5DD, UK
3.University of Bath, Claverton Down, Bath BA2 7AY, UK
Yupeng Gong (yg311@cam.ac.uk)
Adrian Wonfor (aw300@cam.ac.uk)
Richard V. Penty (rvp11@cam.ac.uk)
Published:2020,
Published Online:02 October 2020,
Received:01 March 2020,
Revised:07 September 2020,
Accepted:21 September 2020
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Gong, Y. P. et al. Secure optical communication using a quantum alarm. Light: Science & Applications, 9, 1651-1660 (2020).
Gong, Y. P. et al. Secure optical communication using a quantum alarm. Light: Science & Applications, 9, 1651-1660 (2020). DOI: 10.1038/s41377-020-00409-1.
Optical fibre networks are advancing rapidly to meet growing traffic demands. Security issues
including attack management
have become increasingly important for optical communication networks because of the vulnerabilities associated with tapping light from optical fibre links. Physical layer security often requires restricting access to channels and periodic inspections of link performance. In this paper
we report how quantum communication techniques can be utilized to detect a physical layer attack. We present an efficient method for monitoring the physical layer security of a high-data-rate classical optical communication network using a modulated continuous-variable quantum signal. We describe the theoretical and experimental underpinnings of this monitoring system and the monitoring accuracy for different monitored parameters. We analyse its performance for both unamplified and amplified optical links. The technique represents a novel approach for applying quantum signal processing to practical optical communication networks and compares well with classical monitoring methods. We conclude by discussing the challenges facing its practical application
its differences with respect to existing quantum key distribution methods
and its usage in future secure optical transport network planning.
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